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A s is well known, there are sev­
eral ways in which a structuralist can 
reasonably argue for the mind­inde­
pendent existence of mathematical ob­
jects. One may start, for example, with 
a holistic view of science and resort to 
indispensability arguments, as Michael 
Resnik does in his 1997 book Math-
ematics as a Science of Patterns. But one 
could also start from analytic meta­
physics, take universals as primitive 
entities, and reduce mathematics to a 
theory about them. This is a strategy 
inspired by Armstrong’s theory of in­
stantiated structural universals, devel­
oped in his 1978 book Universals and 
Scientific Realism, and adopted by John 
Bigelow in his 1988 book The Reality 
of Numbers.
I will not discuss in this paper in­
dispensability arguments for realism 
“By Number we understand 
not so much a Multitude  
of Unities, as the abstracted  
Ratio of any Quantity,  
to another Quantity of the 
same kind, which we take 
for Unity.” 
TR 2 2013.indd   132 7/5/2013   11:34:31 AM
PhIlosoPhy • 133
about mathematical objects, since many such discussions are already available 
in the literature.1 Instead, what I want to do is argue that one cannot defend 
realism about numbers on the basis of a metaphysical realism about instantiated 
structural universals. More generally, I also want to suggest that it is mislead­
ing to take a metaphysical view as a basis for the ontology and epistemology of 
mathematics. In order to support my argument, and motivate my suggestion, I 
will discuss what I take to be Bigelow’s failed attempt to reduce number theory 
to a metaphysical theory about instantiated structural universals (henceforth, 
SUs). This attempt fails, I argue, because it purports to reduce a theory we un­
derstand pretty well (number theory) to one which one can barely make sense 
of (the theory of SUs), but also and perhaps more importantly because it flies in 
the face of solid mathematical knowledge.
The outline of my paper is as follows. First, I briefly present Armstrong’s 
theory of structural properties as instantiated universals and Lewis’s devastat­
ing criticism of this theory. Afterwards, I argue that several responses to this 
criticism, by Armstrong, Bigelow, and more recently, by Joan Pagès, can hardly 
succeed. Finally, I show that one possible construal of structural universals via 
non­well­founded sets is resisted by the realist structuralist about mathematics, 
and conclude by pointing out an issue that would have to be addressed by any­
one who wants to pursue Bigelow’s reductionist project: the alleged countability 
of the real numbers.
Armstrong’s Structural Universals and Lewis’ Criticism
Armstrong defines structural properties in the following manner: “A property, S, is structural iff proper parts of particulars having S have some property or properties, T… not identical with S, and this state of 
affairs is, in part at least, constitutive of S” (Armstrong 1978, 69). Then he adds 
that “a structural property must be complex.” One motivation for Armstrong’s 
introduction of structural properties as instantiated universals is to allow for 
the possibility that there are no simple universals, i.e., the possibility that our 
world displays an “infinite descending complexity” of properties and relations 
(see Armstrong 1997, 32f.; compare also Williams 2007). Armstrong considers, 
for example, that it might very well be the case that a particular has an infinity 
of (structural, and so, complex) properties (Armstrong 1978, 72). But he also 
notes that the notion of SUs might lead to a composition problem. For instance, 
the property being two electrons involves, in a certain sense, the property being one 
electron. The latter has to be taken twice over, and this is problematic since as a 
universal being one electron is one, not many (Armstrong 1978, 70).
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Armstrong’s discussion gave rise to a debate that began with a detailed analy­
sis of SUs by David Lewis in his 1986 paper “Against Structural Universals.” 
Lewis notes that a structural universal can be instantiated by many particulars, 
and therefore can be located in different spatiotemporal positions. Where it is 
instantiated, it is wholly located as a nonspatiotemporal part of a particular. 
Further, any particular that instantiates it has to have proper parts and display 
the following characteristic: “there is a necessary connection between the instan­
tiating of the structural universal by the whole and the instantiating of other 
universals by the parts” (Lewis 1986, 27). His examples of SUs are those in­
stantiated by polymers: methane (CH4), butane (CH3CH2CH2CH3), isobutane 
(CH3CH(CH3)2), etc. These involve other universals like carbon, hydrogen, and 
the relation of bonding. 
Lewis takes himself to undermine all reasons for believing in SUs, except the 
one suggested by Armstrong, which I have already mentioned above: the need 
to allow for the possibility of infinite descending complexity. But he notes that 
infinite complexity can be more successfully handled by class nominalism and by 
trope theory (Lewis 1986, 31). I want to focus, in the remainder of this section, 
on his threefold analysis of SUs. 
According to Lewis, an SU can be conceived of (i) linguistically, i.e., as a 
set whose elements are themselves (simple) universals, (ii) pictorially, i.e., as a 
whole, mereologically composed out of other universals taken as proper parts, 
or (iii) magically, i.e., as a whole, non­mereologically composed out of other 
universals. All these conceptions purport to explain the entailment relation be­
tween instantiations of SUs and instantiations of the other universals involved. 
(i) explains SUs as relations between a set and its members. Instantiating, for 
example, the SU methane (i.e., a set) is clearly impossible without also instantiat­
ing the universal carbon (i.e., a member of the set). (ii) explains SUs as relations 
between a whole and its proper parts. It seems pretty clear that an SU cannot be 
wholly instantiated without its proper parts being also instantiated. (iii) gives no 
explanation of the entailment relations. Under this view, the SU methane is com­
pletely distinct from the universal carbon, but their instantiations are nevertheless 
in a necessary part­whole relation and their being so remains unexplained.
Now, Lewis criticizes all these three ways of conceiving of SUs. Let me brief­
ly explain why he does so. (i) is rejected mainly because it seems to ignore the 
motivation for believing in SUs in the first place—allowing for the possibility 
of infinite complexity. Since a set has to be constructed out of non­set elements, 
the “linguistic” conception seems to assume the existence of simple universals. 
Of course, one can ask why would a set have to be constructed out of non­set 
elements? Lewis seems to take here into account only set theories that contain 
an axiom of foundation, like zfc. But surely one can discard this axiom and ac­
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cept non­well­founded sets (i.e., sets that do not have any non­set element) at 
no consistency costs. More on this below.
The “magical” conception, (iii), is rejected because it makes no sense of com­
position, other than a metaphorical one. Since an SU is mereologically atomic, 
i.e., it has no proper parts, there can be no non­magical explanation of the neces­
sary connection between, e.g., the instantiations of butane and the instantiations 
of carbon or hydrogen or bonding. This necessary connection is simply taken as a 
“brute modal fact” (Lewis 1986, 41f.). But, on the one hand, the theory of SU 
is supposed to be modal free, since according to its own defenders, it should 
be the basis for an account of modality.2 On the other hand, to say that carbon 
and hydrogen, once combined, disappear in methane, or that the latter as a part­
less whole is still somehow composed of the former, is not to provide any such 
explanation.
Lewis focuses on the shortcomings of the “pictorial” conception (ii) and 
makes four attempts to fix it. Under this conception, the SU butane is isomorphic 
to a butane molecule, and the parts of the SU are themselves universals instanti­
ated by the parts of the butane molecule. An SU is thus said to be “mereologi­
cally composite.” (ii) appears to successfully explain the necessary connection 
between the instantiating of butane and the instantiating of carbon and hydrogen 
and bonding as a connection between a whole and its proper parts. Furthermore, 
it also seems to allow for the possibility of infinite complexity. However, there 
is still the composition problem already mentioned above: “Each methane mol­
ecule has not one hydrogen atom but four. So if the structural universal methane 
is to be an isomorph of the molecules that are its instances, it must have the uni­
versal hydrogen as a part not just once, but four times over. Likewise for bonded, 
since each molecule has four bonded pairs of atoms. But what can it mean for 
something to have a part four times over? What are there four of? There are 
not four of the universal hydrogen, or of the universal bonded; there is only one” 
(Lewis 1986, 34). Hence, it seems that, after all, the mereological composition 
of universals is sheer mystery. How does Lewis attempt to solve the composition 
problem and thereby fix the “pictorial” conception? 
Lewis’ first proposal is to drop the isomorphism between the SU and its 
instances (Lewis 1986, 36). An SU would be mereologically composed of its 
parts each taken only once. So, for example, butane would be composed of car-
bon, hydrogen, and bonded. But this obviously does not work, since then there 
would be no difference between butane and methane, both being composed of 
the very same three parts. His second proposal is to insist that two SUs could be 
mereologically composed of the very same parts, but that the difference consists 
in how many times over some part is taken in each of them. So, for example, in 
butane, carbon is taken 4 times over, hydrogen 10 times over, and bonded 13 times 
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over, while in methane, carbon is taken only once, hydrogen 4 times, and bonded is 
also taken 4 times over. Therefore, butane is different from methane. However, 
this does not work either, since then one cannot make any difference between 
butane and isobutane. 
The third attempt to fix the “pictorial” conception of SUs drops mereological 
composition and postulates instead a “principle of uniqueness”: no combining 
operation can yield different results if the items operated upon are the same 
(Lewis 1986, 38). But if several operations were applied in different orders, then 
one could get different results even if one started with the same universals. Thus, 
we could construct different SUs even if all we started with was carbon, hydrogen, 
and bonded. The problem with this fix is that, as Lewis points out, the notion 
of a nonmereological composition seems to be oxymoronic. There can very well 
be nonmereological combining operations, but those can hardly be taken as 
compositions. (In the next section, I analyze Armstrong’s opposite view, i.e., his 
endorsement of nonmereological composition, and I will show how it leads him 
into trouble.)
Lewis’ fourth proposal preserves the isomorphism between an SU and its 
instantiations, but postulates the existence of duplicate universals, e.g., the four 
occurrences of hydrogen in methane. Lewis calls them “amphibians,” since they 
are universals that somehow duplicate themselves, so there is not only one uni­
versal for a given predicate, but many. Thus, butane has 10 hydrogen amphib­
ians, 13 bonded amphibians, and 4 carbon amphibians. Of course, questions arise 
immediately as to the cogency of this proposal. As Lewis points out, we were 
interested in explaining the relationship between the SU methane and the uni­
versal carbon, not the connection between methane and the amphibian carbon. 
And if the amphibian carbon is all that is involved in the SU, then what about 
the universal carbon itself? 
Several Responses to Lewis’ Criticism
In his reply to Lewis, in the same issue of the Australian Journal of Philoso-phy, Armstrong attempts to make sense of nonmereological composition by first providing a counterexample to the above “principle of uniqueness”: 
two distinct states of affairs, aRb and bRa, are composed of the same parts, two 
individuals, a and b, and a non­symmetrical relation, R (Armstrong 1986, 85).3 
He identifies SUs with types of states of affairs (Armstrong 1997, 34f.). So, for 
example, methane will be the type of a particular complex state of affairs, which 
is mereologically composed of nine simpler states of affairs (i.e., 4 hydrogen 
atoms, 4 bindings, and one carbon atom). 
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The immediate problem with this idea is that, although an SU is supposed to 
be, according to Armstrong, a nonspatiotemporal part of its instantiations, no 
account is given of how the type of a state of affairs can be a nonspatiotemporal 
part of its tokens.4 It also seems that no such account can be given since the type­
token relation is rather different from the part­whole relation. Furthermore, one 
would have to explain the connection between the type of the complex state of 
affairs and the types of the simpler states of affairs involved. And here one will 
stumble again upon the same problems raised by Lewis: how can one take the 
type hydrogen four times over, when there is only one such type? One would 
eventually have to postulate the existence of some other amphibians, which are 
both types and tokens at the same time. Quite a conundrum.5
Bigelow’s first response to Lewis’ rejection of the “pictorial” conception is 
to bite the bullet and admit amphibians in his ontology (Bigelow 1986, 95). 
Bigelow considers methane to be mereologically composed of four amphibians, 
each containing the universal hydrogen as a part. However, he does not offer any 
single argument to support this view, and it is pretty clear that the same compo­
sition problem as above still comes up. For the universal hydrogen still has to be 
taken four times over, even if now each time as a part of an amphibian. In addi­
tion, being part of an amphibian must be itself an amphibian, and so, it seems 
that universals not only are contained in amphibians, but they also instantiate 
amphibians. But since an amphibian is in fact many, the question arises, which 
amphibian does a universal really instantiate?
Bigelow’s second and more articulate response is inspired by his views on 
quantity and begins by distinguishing three theoretical levels (Bigelow and Par­
getter 1989, 5f.): 
level­one: material individuals (hydrogen atoms, methane molecules, etc.);
level­two: properties and relations between level­one material individuals (be­
ing hydrogen, being methane, being bonded, etc.); these may be 
first order, or possessed simpliciter, and second order, or possessed 
in virtue of other properties or relations;
level­three: ‘numerical’ relations that hold between level­two properties or rela­
tions (being co­instantiated, having the same number of instantia­
tions, etc.).
Now, on the basis of this scheme of three levels, methane is taken as a (conjunc­
tive) level­two, second order, relational property, i.e., as having a part which 
contains the universal carbon, having a part which contains the universal hydro-
gen, having yet another part which contains the universal carbon, and yet another 
which contains the universal hydrogen, and so on. That is, something is a methane 
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molecule in virtue of having parts which instantiate (amphibian) parts and con­
tain other molecules instantiating universals (carbon, hydrogen, etc.). According 
to Bigelow, it is not the case that the SU methane is composed mereologically by 
its conjuncts, but what is essential (i.e., constitutive) to the SU methane is that 
it stands in a level­three, ‘numerical’ relation with its (nine) conjuncts: “Thus, 
‘being methane’ is so related to ‘being carbon’ that ‘being methane’ cannot ex­
ist without standing in that relation to ‘being carbon’” (Bigelow and Pargetter 
1989, 7). On this picture, then, the necessary connection between instantiations 
of methane and instantiations of carbon or hydrogen is not to be explained by 
mereology, but by reference to these constitutive level­three relations. 
However, I think that this solution does not work, either. For how can one 
explain the fact that one constitutive level­three relation between methane and 
hydrogen is distinct from the other three constitutive level­three relations be­
tween methane and hydrogen, since there is only one methane and only one hydro-
gen?6 Furthermore, the level­three relations are themselves universals, and they 
obviously cannot be simple. But if they are complex, then their structure has 
to be explained, too. So, I think that Bigelow’s second response to Lewis does 
nothing more than push the problem of composition one step back. 
More recently, Joan Pagès has also attempted to defend the theory of SUs 
from Lewis’ criticism. She believes that one can make sense of the mereological 
composition of SUs, if one takes them to be constituted by two properties, carbon 
and hydrogen, and two relations, bonded and “a certain formal relation holding 
between instantiations of those universals” (Pagès 2002, 219). Like Bigelow’s 
own proposal, this one, too, departs from Armstrong’s vision of a sparse theory 
of universals, but also from a common conception of universals (see Pagès’ own 
comments on page 220, footnote 6). Pagès’ account is, nevertheless, able to dis­
tinguish mereologically between butane and isobutane,7 because even if no differ­
ence would be apparent when considering only the simpler universals hydrogen, 
carbon, and bonded, there are other distinct universals that enter mereologically 
in the composition of butane and isobutane: the formal relations between the in­
stantiations of these simpler universals. But the mystery of mereological compo­
sition of SUs is still there, I believe, because no explanation is provided of how 
one universal, e.g., hydrogen, can be taken four times over in the composition of 
methane. What is the use, then, of being able to make a difference between two 
isomorphic SUs, when there does not seem to be any way of making good sense 
of the mereological composition of a single SU taken separately?
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Bigelow’s Reduction of Numbers  
to Instantiated Structural Universals
I have shown in the previous two sections that the theory of SUs hardly makes any sense and that Lewis’ criticism of it appears to stand unrefuted. This immediately suggests that it is quite unreasonable to even attempt to 
reduce mathematics to this theory. However, one way out for the reductionist 
might be indicated by a closer consideration of Lewis’ rejection of the “linguis­
tic” conception of SUs. As we have seen in section 1 above, this conception is 
rejected because it seems to assume the existence of simple universals (i.e., non­
set elements of sets) and, thus, to block the possibility of infinite complexity. But 
the assumption could be dropped, as I already suggested, by construing SUs 
within a non­standard set theory, i.e., by discarding the axiom of foundation 
and accepting only non­well­founded sets (i.e., only sets that do not have any 
non­set element). The reduction of number theory to the theory of SUs would 
then of course count as a set­theoretical reduction, a very convoluted one to be 
sure, due to the existence of self­membered sets and universal sets (which can be 
mathematically accommodated though).8
Nonetheless, the reductionist himself resists this reduction as “too bold” (Bi­
gelow 1986, 96), and as driven by nominalist motivations (Bigelow 1988, 46), 
and states quite bluntly: “I am not defending the view that a number is a set: 
I am arguing neither that a number is a set of n­membered sets, nor that it is a 
paradigm n­membered set. Nor, even, is it a property of n­membered sets. Rath­
er, the number n is a universal which is instantiated by the members of any n­
membered set” (Bigelow 1988, 56). And further: “numbers are not themselves 
sets. Rather, they are universals which are instantiated by sets, amongst other 
things” (ibid., 116). More precisely, taking into account the distinction between 
the levels presented above in section 2, natural numbers are level­two relations, 
whereas rational, real, imaginary, and complex numbers are level­three relations. 
So let us adopt, for reductio, the view that numbers are instantiated structural 
universals. My goal, in doing so, is to show how this view leads to mathematical 
absurdities. In order to do that, let us first consider a difficulty raised by Peter 
Milne about the issue of locating relations spatiotemporally. 
Like Lewis, Milne finds structural universals “a huge mystery” (Milne 1994, 
309). He takes up the contention, which supports Bigelow’s views on natural 
numbers, that level­two relations (i.e., relations between physical individuals) 
could be said to be wholly located within any region which contains those indi­
viduals (Bigelow 1988, 22) and are, therefore, themselves physical. He correctly 
replies that this is a non sequitur: “From the assertion that the only relations 
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there are obtain between physical things it does not follow that the relations 
themselves are physical and hence locatable in space­time” (Milne 1994, 311). 
Milne suggests that Bigelow’s position requires a problematic commitment to 
two theses: (a) all relations between physical things are physical, and (b) any­
thing physical is (with approximation) locatable in physical space. 
In fairness to Bigelow, one must note that, in his view, the question “Where 
is it?” is not such that it admits of a straightforward answer. Rather, he is willing 
to loosen the localizability requirement for physicalism and, in view of quantum 
mechanical limitations, to talk about electrons as (being closer to) universals 
(Bigelow 1988, 25). Hence, thesis (b) can be attributed to him only if the ap­
proximation of locality in physical space is sufficiently large to accommodate 
multi­locatable physical things (e.g., relations, numbers, etc.). Be that as it may, 
one would still need an argument in support of thesis (a), but Bigelow simply 
provides none.
As proposed, let us provisionally adopt the view defended by Bigelow and 
then briefly look at the immediate consequences. According to this view, natural 
numbers are level­two relations between physical relata. What about rational 
and real numbers? Bigelow quotes from Newton’s Arithmetica Universalis: “By 
Number we understand not so much a Multitude of Unities, as the abstracted 
Ratio of any Quantity, to another Quantity of the same kind, which we take 
for Unity.” He reads Newton’s ratio between quantities as a proportion (un­
derstood in the most general sense), or a level­three relation between universals 
(Bigelow 1988, 69). Thus, rational numbers are level­three relations of this sort. 
Furthermore, a real number is said to be a level­three relation between two in­
commensurable magnitudes, i.e., between two universals. The square root of 2, 
for example, is the relation between the universal side and the universal diagonal 
in the SU square. By thesis (a) above and because according to Bigelow’s Arm­
strongian position all universals are physically instantiated, it follows that this 
relation is physically instantiated. Thus, real numbers are physically instantiated. 
But then, since according to him everything physical can be counted, it follows 
that real numbers are countable (ibid., 116). Needless to say, this flies in the face 
of solid mathematical knowledge (Cantor’s diagonal proof of the uncountability 
of the reals, in particular).
In conclusion, I believe it is plausible to regard Bigelow’s structuralism about 
numbers, defended on the basis of Armstrong’s metaphysical realism about uni­
versals, as untenable. Numbers are not instantiated structural universals. What 
this suggests, more generally, is that taking a metaphysical view as a basis for a 
philosophy of mathematics may be misleading. But as I pointed out at the out­
set, there are other routes open to the realist structuralist about mathematics.
q
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Notes
 1. See for example, Colyvan 2003 and Baker 2003.
 2. “Modality is a huge mystery to me, and I would love to have a clearer understanding 
of it. One of my key motives for exploring metaphysics and mathematics has been 
the desire to get a clearer grip on modality. My hunch is that modal claims rest on 
facts about relations among universals” (Bigelow 1988, 38). And further: “I hope 
that an adequate theory of universals should give an explanation of the grounds for 
necessity and possibility. . . . the construction of universals, using sets and possibilia, is 
beside the point from the perspective I am taking here” (103).
 3. It is essential to Armstrong’s point that R be a non­symmetrical relation. So, for 
example, one could say that Mary, John, and loving can combine to form two states 
of affairs, John’s loving Mary and Mary’s loving John. But, of course, this is still not 
sufficient to show that the nonmereological composition of SUs makes sense, since 
no support is given to the idea that they involve non­symmetrical relations. 
 4. Similar comments have been recently made in Pagès 2002, 217.
 5. For another attempt to deflect Lewis’ criticism and further develop Armstrong’s 
conception of structural universals, see Kalhat 2008.
 6. Note that it would not help to give here Armstrong’s counterexample, mentioned 
above at the outset of section 2, since non­symmetry is not an obvious characteristic 
of the level­three relations constitutive of methane. 
 7. Her graphical representation of an isobutane molecule (Pagès 2002, 216) is, how­
ever, incorrect since it instantiates bonded 15 times, and so makes isobutane different 
from butane even without the help of formal relations.
 8. For other recent attempts to overcome the problems pointed out by Lewis, cf. 
Mormann 2010.
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Abstract
Is Mathematics the Theory of Instantiated Structural Universals?
The paper contends that one cannot defend realism about numbers on the basis of a metaphysical 
realism about instantiated structural universals, suggesting that it is misleading to take a meta­
physical view as a basis for the ontology and epistemology of mathematics. The author criticizes 
Bigelow’s attempt to reduce number theory to a metaphysical theory about instantiated structural 
universals, which purports to reduce number theory to the theory of structural universals, and 
which flies in the face of solid mathematical knowledge. The study begins with a presentation of 
Armstrong’s theory of structural properties as instantiated universals and of Lewis’s devastating 
criticism of this theory, arguing that several responses to this criticism, by Armstrong, Bigelow, 
and more recently, by Joan Pagès, can hardly succeed. Finally, it contends that one possible con­
strual of structural universals via non­well­founded sets is resisted by the realist structuralist about 
mathematics. The conclusion highlights an issue that would have to be addressed by anyone who 
wants to pursue Bigelow’s reductionist project: the alleged countability of the real numbers.
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